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A seemingly interminable shortage of "adequate" shelter haunts the lives
of a substantial number of residents of African townships. The inadequate
supply of residential buildings has evoked numerous attempts by "radical"
intellectuals to analyse the housing question (Bloch, 1982; Labour Re-
search Committee, 1983b; Mare, 1980a; McCarthy and Srait, 1984; Ratcliffe,
1980; Wilkinson, 1980; 1981a; 1981b). These writings are characterised
by a notion of the necessity for state and capital to ensure the reprod-
uction of labour power. T^iey are marked by a paucity of empirical detail.
Moreover, a significant omission in these analyses is any consideration
of the fact that for construction and financial firms
 f.the provision of
residential buildings is a way of accumulating capital. :
Under conditions of capitalist commodity production, capital accumu-
lation takes place in all sectors. Residential buildings, including those
in .African townships, are constructed according to certain financial im-
peratives: the cost of machinery, tools, materials and labour power.
Under the influence of market forces private firms sell the completed
dwellings at a given price. In the course of these activities these firms
appropriate a certain sum of capital in the form of profit.
This paper investigates the activities involved in the accumulation
of capital through construction of dwellings in Witwatersrand African
townships. It attempts to explain the manner in which building con-
struction, development and financial firms conduct their business, and
to crystallise the effects of these business activities on the delivery
of residential buildings in the townships. The Witwatersrand was chosen1
as the area of study because a relatively large amount of building ac-
tivity occurs there. During 1983 33% of all building activity was con-
centrated in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) area. With the
exception of the Western Cape (14%) the remaining activity was evenly
scattered in small pockets over the rest of the country (Business and
Marketing Intelligence, 1984: viii). A cursory examination indicates
that residential buildings in African townships on the Witwatersrand are
a relatively major field of capital accumulation. Since 1980 a relatively
large amount of capital has turned over in the construction and allocation
by private capital of such buildings (see Table I ) . 1
In addition to private investments, state contracts appear to be
equally significant as an area of accumulation (see Table 2). The cre-
ation of a living environment requires more than the simple construction
of a house. Accordingly state investment has not been confined to con-
tracts for the construction of dwellings and installation of site ser-
vices , but has included the provision of township infrastructure and
trading services. This has been concentrated mainly in the
electrification and upgrading of Soweto. Upgrading has also taken place
in other African townships - though not on the scale of that undertaken
in Soweto (Aubert and Bristow, 1984: 25; 48; 52; 67; 86; 94; Boya, 1984c;
1984d; SAIRR, 1984: 272). By 1984 R424 million had been invested in the
electrification and upgrading of these townships, and it is expected that
by 1990 an additional R440 million will have been spent (see table 3).
The enormity of the state's involvement can hardly be ignored as a sig-
nificant feature in the accumulation of capital in this field. For this
reason it requires closer investigation.
State Housing Policy and Accumulation.
Variations in government housing policy have had an uneven impact on the
quantity of capital accumulated in the area of African residential
buildings. Much capital was accumulated in the state subsidised building
programmes of the 1950s and 1960s. This resulted in the state being the
single largest landlord in the urban townships - by 1979 state housing
stock in the prescribed areas was estimated to total 468 000 units
(Riekert Commission, 1979). Between 1960 and 1969 the state also invested
R31,41 million in the construction of 67 009 houses in the homelands
(SAIRR, 1969: 143). This was in line with the apartheid policy that urban
townships were places of temporary sojourn for Africans. In addition to
government loans the main sources of finance for these programmes were
profits from beer sales and annual contributions from employers in terms
of the Bantu Services Levy Act (1952).
During the late 1960s and early 1970s the construction of houses in
the homelands accelerated: some 33 169 units were built and R85,5 million
was invested by the state in the development of homeland towns (SAIRR,
1980: 406). At the same time state policy limited the provision of res-
idential buildings for Africans living in the prescribed areas.2 In 1970
3703, in 1971 1089 and in 1972 only 954 units were built in "white" South
Africa (SAIRR, 1976: 84). This decline assonated with the policy of re-
locating to the bantustans the growing throng of unemployed and dispos-
sessed rural and urban workers, itself a likely consequence of the rapid
inflow of technology and capital goods to both the manufacturing and ag-
ricultural sectors (Mare, 1980b).
Since the late 1970s the state has once again provided relatively more
capital for the development of site infrastructure and residential ac-
commodation in the prescribed areas.3 Between 1977 and 1982 31 507 houses
were provided by the government for Africans in "white" South Africa, at
a total cost of R214,89 million (SAIRR, 1984: 268). Since 1983 annual
state spending on Witwatersrand township houses, hostels, high rise flats
(a recent addition to the repertoire of African residential buildings)
and site infrastructure, has averaged at R73,8 million per annum (see
table 2).
The relatively large scale involvement of the central state in fi-
nancing the provision of residences for African townships has channeled
the accumulation process through specific organisational structures.
Until 1979 a Black housing board - under the auspices of the department
of Co-operation and Development - had the power to develop various housing
schemes in the townships. Since then the department of Community Devel-
opment, through the National Housing Commission (NHC), has assumed this
role (Morris, 1981: 114). Once the NHC has approved a building project
it lends the necessary funds to the local government authority from the
National Housing Fund (NHF). The latter then enter into contracts with
the building construction companies for the construction of the houses.
Money granted by the NHF to the local authorities is in the form of a
loan, plus interest which varies from 3,5% to 9,25 % (Labour Research
Committee, 1983a: 174). This is decidedly lower than current building
society interest rates (Interview 21). It is also lower than the in-
flation rate, which stood at 11% for 1983 (SAIRR, 1984: 122) and is ex-
pected to rise rapidly in the future. It might appear from this that the
state is in fact subsidising the difference between the rate of interest
it charges on its loans and the inflation rate. Monthly rentals, however,
continue for an interminable period and it is likely that at some future
juncture a sum of money far in excess of the total loan will be redeemed
from the township residents. In the short term, however, the advance of
state loans remains a sine qua non for private accumulation in rented
African accommodation.
In addition to an increase in the scale of government sponsored resi-
dential construction programmes, a commitment by the state to encourage
greater private sector and employer involvement in the provision of
African housing (SAIRR, 1983: 290-291), has also had a positive impact
on accumulation. In the wake of the Soweto upheaval in 1976, and fol-
lowing the recommendations of the Riekert Commission in 1979 (Morris,
1981: 112) and the Viljoen Committee report in 1982, certain policy
changes were introduced. The most significant of these changes are the
introduction of homeownership under 99 year leasehold, the sale of state
housing stock at special discount rates, the lifting of restrictions on
the operations of private development companies in the townships and the
implementation of self help schemes.5
The right of 99 year leasehold makes possible a long term tenure of
land to Africans with permanent urban residential rights. An amendment
to the Financial Institutions Act (in 1978) empowers building societies
to advance loans directly to African leaseholders (SAIRR, 1979: 328).
The amount of capital that could be accumulated on the 99 year leasehold
is not insignificant - in Daveyton alone there are 10 841 stands available
for purchase under the leasehold scheme, valued at R4,95 million (Boya,
1984a). The commencement of the government's major house selling
programme in July 1983, has made an additional 350 000 dwellings available
for occupancy under the leasehold provisions (SAIRR,1984: 270). Besides
building societies, land surveyors stand to accumulate Rl,6 million from
the 23 000 sites on the Witwatersrand which require surveying before they
can be made available for leasehold (Boya, 1984b). By 1988 it is esti-.
mated that this figure will have grown to R7,l million (Boya, 1984e).
Furthermore R28 million has been set aside by the state to complete the
surveying of all potential 99 year leasehold sites within five years
(Boya, 1984f).*
The terms of the leasehold permit the acquisition of township stands
by private sector developers and construction firms. This is a pre req-
uisite for the fairly large amounts of capital which are being turned over
in the private market (see Table 1). Homeownership rights under the
leasehold also gives those Africans able to purchase and concentrate
housing in their own hands the opportunity to accumulate capital by
emerging as a definite group of private landlords (Mabin and Parnell,
1983: 156). The relatively cheap prices on the recently introduced house
selling programme, and the application of the leasehold provisions to the
even cheaper "self help" houses, is likely to facilitate this process.
In fact, by giving those who are unable to afford the price of conven-
tionally built houses the opportunity of constructing or supervising the
construction of houses to lower building specifications", state policy
has opened up further territory for the accumulation of capital by small
time builders, as well as by those firms involved in the building mate-
rials industry. ^
The accumulation of capital in the African housing market has taken
place not merely within the limitations of central government policy.
It has also been shaped by local government functions. Local authority
housing functions have been transformed over time. In the 50s and 60s
some local authorities were directly involved in the accumulation proc-
ess: they actually built the houses. For instance between 1948 and 1960,
40 682 houses as well as many schools, administration blocks, clinics and
beer halls were built in Soweto by the Johannesburg City Council's housing
division. Similarly between 1957 and 1960 5115 houses and hostels for
1576 people were erected in Kwa Mashu, Durban, by the Durban corporation.
By 1967 1200 houses and 3700 hostel beds had been provided in the newly
established township of Sebokeng in the Vaal Triangle (Morris, 1981:
60-88). In terms of the Black Affairs Administration Act of 1971 these
functions were taken over from the local authorities by the administration
boards. During the period 1970 to 1980 the boards possessed a near mo-
nopoly over these and other powers. They also decided who was eligible
for housing on the basis of qualification to be in an urban area (Urban
Foundation, 1983: 3). In certain instances the boards had the power to
determine rentals and service charges, and their employees, the township
managers, were responsible for collecting these rents and for issuing
lodger permits.
The period after the 1976 Soweto upheaval has witnessed a significant
transformation of these functions. Local arms of the central government
no longer construct or manage the building of dwellings. Recent legis-
lative changes have transformed the administration boards into develop-
*)
ment boards. In their new role the boards continue to act as development
agents for new land, for bulk and link infrastructure, and for two types
of housing: low cost state financed housing projects and hostels for
migrant workers - As agents of the state they remain the owners of state
land and state housing stock. In the procedure of home ownership acqui-
sition they process the 99 year leasehold applications. The actual
building process is undertaken by private construction firms, while de-
velopment companies organise the subcontracts for the installation of
site infrastructure and the erection of the superstructures.
The post 1976 period has also witnessed the gradual devolution of other
local authority housing functions to a new third tier of government in
the prescribed areas. The 1977 Community Councils Act gave community
councils the responsibility to allocate and administer the letting of
houses - subject to the approval of the minister of Plural Relations and
Development. In contrast, the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 auto-
matically devolved typical local government functions on the new town
councils, established in November-December 1983. The town councils have*1
the power to allocate sites for private sector development companies, and
state funded houses to township residents. In conjunction with the de-
velopment boards, they also have some power, in contracting for the pro-
vision of services and the building of dwellings from state funds (Bekker
and Humphries, 1985 : 90; 112; 115).
The granting of these housing functions to the local councils appears
to reflect the leitmotiv of "improving the quality of life" for urban
Africans - and therefore to have some support in the Botha administration.
Many of the development board bureaucrats who are decidedly paternalistic
cowards those they perceive as their wards, oppose the devolution of these
powers to the councils. The prospect of losing some of their traditional
functions to the community councils led to widespread opposition from the
boards to the Community Councils Act (Bekker and Humphries, 1985: 100).
The relationship between the boards and the new councils is then, not
surprisingly, characterised by conflict. This conflict could have averse
effects on the accumulation of capital in the African residential building
industry as there may be no clearly defined local authority function which
private business can familiarise itself with.
Local authority housing functions are not unaffected by the explosive
political situation in the townships. Cut off as they are from popular
support6 local councils are particularly vulnerable to the violent events
currently taking place in the townships. In recent months popular out-
bursts of violence have led to the demise of many councils - none exist
in the strife torn Eastern Cape townships as councillors, fearing for
their lives, have disappeared into hiding. Although the situation on the
Witwatersrand has not reached this stage, several councils there have been
hamstrung by heightened social struggles being waged around them. As a
result some long term capital development projects have had to be shelved
and essential services such as refuse and night soil removal have been
disrupted in some townships (Sunday Tribune, 21/7/85). All this bodes
ill for the continuation of accumulation in residential accommodation in
these areas. The building and allocation of dwellings can hardly be
pursued with confidence and vigour, under such conditions.
Local government nous ing funct ions provide an immediate framework'
within which capital is directly accumulated through a complex of private
business practices. In addition to liasing with local agents of govern-
ment , private business also provides houses directly to those African
breadwinners who desire and can afford home ownership. As state employees
the majority of these are aided through a government housing subsidy
(Interviews 12 and 23). Building societies provide a large proportion
of loans to cover the cost of construction. By 1982 1324 bonds under the
99 year leasehold system were registered with all building societies
(United Building Society, 1982). Since 1982 this figure has grown rapidly
- a fact borne out by the number of new houses sold in African townships
on the Witwatersrand (see Table 1) and the number of sales of state owned
housing units. By December 1984 there were a total of 23 311 registered
99 year leaseholds (including 14 727 under the sale of state houses)
(SAIRR, 1980 - 1984; Interview 20).
In attempting to build and sell dwellings, businesses are faced by
numerous obstacles. These are not restricted to the abovementioned bu-
reaucratic structures. Cash-flow problems and consumer resistance are
as formidable as in other industrial sectors. The current economic re-
cession exacerbates the impact of these problems. Businesses clearly need
to devise strategies in order to surmount these obstacles, and thereby
to accelerate the rate at which they are accumulating capital.
Business Practices on the Witwatersrand, and their Effect on the Rhythm
of Accumulation.
The general effect of business activity in the Witwatersrand townships
has been to accelerate the rhythm of accumulation in the provision of
residences to Africans. Between 1982 and 1985 accumulated capital in both
the private market and state contracts (see tables 1, 2 and 3) grew by
164% - in the same period total annual turnover on the private market
increased by more than 745% (see table 1).
During the years 1982, 1984 and 1985 a pattern emerged whereby the top
one third of development companies came to control on average 65,1% of
capital turned over in the private market (see table 4). With the ex-
ception of George Wimpey, all these companies increased their turnover
in the period 1982 - 1984i5 (see table 5). In addition there appear to
be a host of other companies which, although less involved, are never-
theless making a not insignificant contribution towards total capital
turnover. In 1983 they accounted for 51,8% of turnover. During 1982,
1984 and 1985 their average annual contribution stood at 34,86% (see table
5). Included in this group are some smaller African building contractors.
Some of these build to contract or speculate, as the case may be. For
example, between 1983 and 1984 40 sites were allocated to 10 such builders
in Vosloorus. Included in this group were H and T Construction, Sefatse
Contractors (both of Vosloorus) and A Masondo (of Katlehong) (Interview
22). By October 1984 25 units had been built and sold. Other small
African concerns are: Siyasana, the Tembisa Construction Company and
Fritz Construction Company (Interview 14).
There are also a number of small African entrepreneurs in the field
of building materials and components. For instance, in Soweto alone,
there are 19 hardware stores, while Daveyton has a dealer in building
materials. Kwa Thema has two brick makers and a plumber (Aubert and
Bristow, 1984: 25; 42; 57). The appearance of these petty accumulators
and others was made possible by the reforms to existing legislation re-
ferred to earlier. Going hand in hand with these was the establishment,
in March 1979, by Anton Rupert, one of South Africa's leading capitalists,
of the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC), the aim of which
is to lend assistance to small businesses in commerce, industry and ser-
vices (SAIRR, 1980: 248). In 1981 the SBDC established its first indus-
trial park in Orlando West, Soweto. It was occupied by 34 small
businesses, many of them accumulating capital directly in the building
materials and components industries (SAIRR, 1983: 129). By 1984 another
industrial park had been established in Dobsonville. The Urban Foundation
has developed a third park in Katlehong (Aubert and Bristow, 1984: 44;
54).
Morris (1981: 130) explains that the following problems were being
encountered by these small businesses:
"Most builders had previously been working for white contractors
and their knowledge of making tenders, obtaining finance and sub
contracting is limited. Those builders who work directly for a
client usually sell their labour only, requiring the client to
supply all building materials. Few have access to loan capital and
cannot offer credit facilities to clients. Payment is required
before or during the building operation. The co-ordination of se-
veral sub-contractors by a general contractor is rare. Some
builders have unreliable reputations and there is no system for
identifying reliable ones"
These problems suggest that the base of accumulation by these firms is
perhaps precarious and unstable.
Additions and alterations and self help schemes appear to be an im-
portant area of business activity on the private market, albeit less
significant than conventional housebuilding. Between 1981 and 1983 3600
plans for additions and alterations were approved in Soweto alone, to-
talling a sum of R35 million (Aubert and Bristow, 1984:.39). Currently
there are two self help projects on the Witwatersrand: one in Katlehong
and one in Soweto. The former scheme covers 472 sites. There are 260
houses which are in the process of being completed, involving a total
investment of R3,9 million (representing 4,5% of the. national total).
The latter scheme is at Naledi and covers 3000 sites. Currently 1089
houses are in the process of being completed, involving a total investment
of R15, 2 million (representing 17,4% of the national total) (Business
and Marketing Intelligence, 1984: 126-127).
Business activity in this area is reportedly counteracting the
shrinking building and property markets, according to the National Asso-
ciation of Home Builders (NAHB) (Sunday Times, 5/5/85). This appears to
be borne out by the activities of the Schachat and Goldstein groups, both
of which appear to have a ready alternative in this market. Schachat
Homes (Pty) Ltd is a subsidiary of Schachat Holdings Ltd, through which
it is linked to the Sage Group of Companies, a home building group which
operates both within and outside the mass housing market (Business and
Marketing Intelligence, 1984; 117). In 1974, and again during 1981,
Schachat Holdings was a major contributor towards the profits of the Sage
group (Star, 12/5/74; Rand Daily Mail, 3/9/81). Schachat Homes, in turn,
is a significant contributor towards overall turnover of Schachat
Holdings Ltd. In 1984 the company turnover was approximately R5 million.
In 1985 it is expected to reach R14 million, and R20 million by the end
of 1986 (Interview 12). Considering that the total turnover of capital
in Schachat Holdings is expected to stabilise at R100 million per annum
(Interview 12), Schachat Homes will be making an important contribution
of 20% towards overall group turnover.
Gough Cooper Homes (Pty) Ltd is another large development company
linked into a corporate group structure which is headed by SM Goldstein
Ltd. As the African home building section, Gough Cooper Homes makes the
major contribution towards the group's wealth. In 1984 the Goldstein
group turned over R218,9 million worth of capital. Its pre-tax profit
stood at R9,2 million. Gough Cooper Homes contributed 18,2% towards
overall group turnover and a massive 57,4% towards pre tax profit. In
1983 the figures were 22% and 53% respectively (Registrar, 052955706).
Some foreign firms might also view involvement in the African resi-
dential building industry as a way of increasing turnover during a
recessionary business cycle. The world recession has had such a negative
impact on the business activities of George Wimpey - a multi national
company involved in the building industry - that company personnel are
seriously examining the African market in South Africa as an alternative
(Interview 13).
Access to Capital Resources:
A preliminary analysis reveals that access to large capital resources
is a sine qua non for companies which dominate this field. Nowhere is
this more evident than in the electrification and upgrading schemes. The
reasons for this inhere in the economies of scale involved in these ac-
tivities. The construction of access roads and the installation of water,
electrical and sewerage systems across entire townships is an activity
which involves a degree of capital outlay prohibitive to the smaller
general building contractor. Furthermore, the latter activities also
involve specialist engineering and electrical skills which are not
normally available to the smaller concerns.
The electrification of Soweto was undertaken by Siemens and GEC Power
Distributors, companies backed by a relatively large amount of fixed as-
sets. The GEC group consists of 10 subsidiary and four associate compa-
nies, and covers a broad range of industrialised manufacturing activities
from machinery through engineering to electric appliances and transfor-'
mers (General Electric Company, 1979). GEC Power Distributors has in-
stalled 50 sub stations in the Soweto scheme - worth R17 million (Rand
Daily Mail, 23|3|SO). Another company involved in the Soweto
electrification scheme was Brown Boveri South Africa, a subsidiary of the
giant Swiss electronics multi-national of the same name. It received the
contract for the six sub stations of Greater Soweto (Argus, 22|1|81).
These corporate interests are not only represented at the level of main
contractors. Some subcontractors also have access to group assets. AEG
Telefunken is one such case. It was awarded a contract worth R2,5 million
for switchgear panels and the erection of five substations in the Soweto
electrification project (SA Builder, 10J1980: 41). A further example is
Asea Electric (South Africa) Ltd. Asea tendered R520 191 for the pro-
duction of transformers for the Daveyton electrification scheme (Boya,
1984c; 1984d). During 1981 it was awarded a series of subcontracts for
the Soweto scheme (Argus, 28|1|81). As a direct subsidiary of Power
Technologies (POWERTECH) it has access to the high technology electronics
industry (Asea Electric (SA), 1983). Through the GEC Group and Asea the
larger corporate groupings appear to dominate the supply of electrical
components to African township electrification schemes. A third example
of a subcontractor linked to a corporate group is the African Development
and Construction Company (AD and CC), a subsidiary of the National African
Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC) and of Roberts Construction. AD
and CC won the contract for building work on the main receiving station
at Soweto and for the substations at Diepkloof, Mofolo, Zola, Mapetla and
Moroka. The contract included the associated domestic, electrical and
plumbing installations and was valued at Rl,4 million (SA Builder,
10|1980: 41).
Depth of capital resources also appears to be a necessary condition
for the relatively large turnover of capital by some of the top third of
development companies. The reasons for this are threefold. In the first
instance these companies seem to require large amounts of capital as fi-
nancial cover for the immediate labour, materials capital depreciation,
insurance and financial costs incurred in the undertaking of large scale
homebuilding - the cost merely of providing infrastructure is R5000 per
unserviced stand, and must be borne initially by the developer (Williams,
1984). Secondly there are costs incurred in administering and organising
the building and selling of houses for Africans. Finally, because many
potential homeowners do not have the funds to pay for their own houses,
development companies require building societies to supply sufficient
money to fund the buying of houses (Williams, 1984).
A top company such as Schachat Homes has access to relatively large
amounts of fixed capital. One of its parent companies, Nedbank alone can
call on assets of R12 825 million. As at December 1984 the liquid assets
of another major holding company, UAL, was R53,5 million. The Sage group
of companies, to which Schachat Homes belongs, can itself call on R32,7
million in liquid assets (Financial Mail, 24|5|85: 392).
Gough Cooper Homes (Pty) Ltd, another of the top third of African
housing development companies on the Witwatersrand, also has access to
relatively large assets. It is part of a corporate group headed by SM
Goldstein Ltd. Ranked as the 99th largest company in South Africa, SM
Goldstein has assets exceeding R115 million.
The importance of adequate financial resources is underlined by the
effect on George Wimpey of a shortage of finance. This appears to be a
major reason for its very limited involvement in this market. Wimpey, a
general housebuilding company operating in the white, coloured and Indian
areas, started in the African housing field in 1981. It confined its
activities to Soweto. By 1984 it had completed a total of 540 houses
there. Its peak year, 1982, yielded a turnover of R6,5 million - still
less than 20% of total company turnover (Interview 7). Wimpey required
financial cover for 18 months, during which period it was buying and
servicing the land, building the structures, and selling the houses. It
was only after this that it could expect repayment on investments. Partly
because its British holding company was unwilling to loan it the finance,
and partly because there was a delay of up to 9 months between bond ap-
plication and registration with the building societies, Wimpey found it-
self unable to cope financially. It does not possess the influence
necessary to accelerate the process whereby building society loans are
granted (Interview 13).
Marketing Techniques:
It appears that some firms which dominate this market might do so not'
only because of their access to superior capital resources. By engaging
in certain marketing techniques with prospective homeowners and their
employers they could conceivably be expanding their share of the market.
Perhaps the 132% increase in the turnover of Schachat Homes between 1984
and 1985 (see table 5) is also indicative of this. Schachat's special
sales consultants make themselves available to clients over the weekends
in order to satisfy their needs. Its houses incorporate various levels
of specification to suit the client's requirements - while allowing for
personal preference in respect of floor finishes, wall tiles and built
in cupboards. Furthermore, it claims that the design of its houses at-
tempts to incorporate "the traditions" of the urban African communities.
The prohibitive cost of housing makes it almost impossible for the po-
tential homeowners to attain their objective without some form of as-
sistance from their employers (be they from the private or public
sectors). Schachat Homes regard it as a task for the development company
to motivate the employers to assist these housing schemes (Williams,
1984).
The view that marketing technique is an important factor in the growth
of businesses involved in the building and allocation of residential
buildings for Africans, is supported by the fact that several of the less
successful companies failed to pay any attention to influencing the tastes
of their consumers(Interviews 7 and 13). Indeed, in the opinion of per-
sonnel involved in this field, this was the primary reason for one company
closing down their operations in the private market in 1983 - barely four
years after having started. During this period it constructed approxi-
mately 100 houses in Daveyton, 150 in Kwa Thema and Springs, and 100 in
Soweto. Many people experienced difficulties in raising loans to cover
the cost - approximately R17 000 per unit. A further problem was the fact
that residents rejected the monotony which they perceived in the style
of the newly constructed houses (Interview 17). This company is currently
focussing on the area of mass housing, arguing that business is more
profitable when it is involved in the construction of multiple units
(Interview 6).
Paying attention to individual clients is, however, not a sufficient
condition for successful business activities. This is clearly demon-
strated in the performance of a relatively new company which started
operations in 1983. Its business is premised on the attitude that one
has to have rapport with "the people on the ground" in order to determine
their needs. In spite of the relatively cheap core house which it has
designed - R8000 for two rooms and a central bathroom - the extent of its
business activities remain rather limited. In the space of one year it
has built only 10 houses and 5 shops (most of these being in Daveyton)
(Interview 17). A lack of capital resources resources is not necessarily
the only problem facing this firm. It does not appear to have the in-
fluence with the bureaucrats in order to facilitate the flow of business.
Political Influence:
Access to large capital resources and the use of sophisticated mar-
keting techniques do not guarantee the successful prosecution of business
in the African residential building industry on the Witwatersrand. Com-
panies also seem to require political influence at both local and central
government level in order to capture a significant share of the market.
Political influence here refers to the effect of the practice of social
power, both through conventional and irregular procedures.
Land in African townships is still "de jure" owned by the central
government, according to existing conventions. Nevertheless, political
practices aimed at restructuring social relations in the townships have
resulted in local councils on the Witwatersrand increasingly assuming
more control over the disposal of this land (Williams, 1984; DCAD, 1984).
Aplications have to be made to the black local authorities for land before
building can commence. The normal procedure is for applications to be
made in writing to the respective councils. For example, during 1982
Concor Homes, Long Homes, Dzinga and Nzama and Associates, LB Mahlangu
Builders and AD and CC all made written applications to the Daveyton
Community Council for sites on the "426 scheme" (Daveyton Town Council,
1984b).
Strong obstacles within the councils, to the allocation of land to some
private businesses, often necessitate a more effective approach than the
written application. Business personnel claim that many councillors on
the Witwatersrand are illiterate and "naive", and that as a consequence
they do not understand the procedures involved in the formal application
for and allocation of sites. This delays the allocation of stands.
Nevertheless a well informed albeit small group of councillors is said
to exist (Interviews 19 and 23). The strategy of certain firms is to
attempt to influence this group. On 13th October 1984 a director of a
private development company addressed the councillors present at the an-
nual conference of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa (UCASA),
the umbrella body of many of the new black local councils. He devoted
the latter part of his speech to a detailed explanation of both the fiscal
and bureaucratic imperatives involved in the actual processes of devel-
oping and selling property in the townships (Williams, 1984). Another
company, which has also concentrated on developing relationships with
some local councillors, employs an African person for this role. He
claims that a sympathetic local council assisted him in obtaining a share
of stands in the face of competition from rivals. He has also been ap-
pointed to UCASA as an "expert" on development and as an analyst of the
housing situation (Interview 19). Corroborating evidence for the exist-
ence of this practice comes from Mr A Rabie, ex director of housing on
the West Rand Development Board, who claims'that the company is using a
"blatantly political way" of gaining access to the market (Interview 18).
A further example of effective influence on a local council is the
presence (during September 1982) of a company employee on a township
housing development committee. According to a community councillor, this
committee had been established in order that he and fellow councillors
could have the opportunity of working with township developers and thereby
coming to understand the intricacies of housing development (Daveyton
Community Council, 1982). The committee subsequently ratified the allo-
cation of stands to particular company.
The problems experienced by another company with respect to a partic-
ular counci's stand allocation practices is further evidence of the ob-
stacles presented by some councils - and the need for companies to devise
strategies to surmount these. The latter decided to allocate only five
stands at a time, and to demand that the company have built and sold these
houses before receiving the next batch of stands. Furthermore, there
seemed to be no guarantee that the next five stands would be forthcoming.
The firm told the council that it could not operate in this manner. In-
formal influence and formal representations to the council eventually led
to a change in council policy. Underlying this policy there appeared to
be a desire to allocate relatively more stands to African builders than
to companies controlled by white people - the latter being regarded with
a certain amount of resentment.
Accusations of nepotism and corruption within the councils have also
been made by an employee of a firm which has still to achieve the rela-
tively large turnover of capital of some of the top third of development
companies. The firm applied for the allocation of two parcels of land,
one of which appeared to be ideal for residential development. This part
was allocated to the a group of companies owned by a prominent African
businessman, while that allocated to the company suffered severely from
rock formations, rubbish dumps and quarry excavations. Its dealings with
another council led the company to conclude that many of the council of-
ficials were corrupt (Interview 7).
Several companies claim that wielding influence over the local coun-
cils does not by itself ensure the continuation and expansion of their
business activities - firms also have to overcome the strong obstacles
allegedly posed by some development board personnel. Some of these of-
ficials have been accused of stimying business opportunities in the
Witwatersrand townships by slowing down the processing of necessary doc-
uments (Interviews 19 and 23). It is, for example, said that the regis-
tration of 99 year leases can take anything from three to six months
(Interview 19). "Petty sabotage" by development board officials has also
been mentioned as a stumbling block for business operations. One might,
for example, require a sewer connection, only to discover that board of-
ficials are unwilling to provide it (Interviews 5 and 17). Some devel-
opment board officials deny these allegations. Officially it is claimed
that the papers for 99 year leasehold are processed within a maximum pe-
riod of 10 days, at which stage a temporary right to leasehold is issued
(Interview 10). Complaints about delays are seen as being unreasonable
because, it is argued, the movement of documents "naturally" takes time
(Interviews 2 and 15). Notwithstanding these denials, allegations of
development board officials attempting to sabotage housing projects are
so widespread on the Witwatersrand (Interviews 5, 7, 17, 19 and 23), that
they must be taken into account. Indeed, it is unlikely that these of-
ficials will admit to such practices. In the light of recent changes in
state housing policy they would clearly be seen to be breaking the rules.
Clearly, there are definite ideological reasons for more conservative
officials to oppose the direct penetration of the townships by private
capital. Not only does this process restrict their administrative func-
tion. It also presupposes the lifting of some restrictions on the move-
ments of the residents. That such conservative ideological viewpoints
are still in force within the East and West Rand Boards, is suggested by
the crude reference of a white official to a member of his town council
as a "kaffir" (Interview 8).
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At a local level companies claim to have overcome some of these ob-
stacles through a combination of two strategies: influencing personnel
within the boards themselves and allying themselves with local council-
lors against the boards. White officials working for one council in
Soweto are said to have accepted payment "for favours" (Interview 7).
Officials seconded to the Soweto council are alleged to have accepted
bribes during 19S3, before providing a sewerage connection (Interview
17)\ The above mentioned are examples of an influence over officials
seconded to the local councils. More important effects seem to have been
achieved through winning the sympathy of officials in the upper echelons
of the East Rand Development Board. A prominent company, for instance,
claims to have a close working relationship with the board's directorate
(Interview 23). It acknowledges that there is a genuine desire on the
part of this development board to give effect to the "new dispensation".
However, it remains incumbent upon this developer to push aggressively
his requirements with the relevant officials. This firm's account of its
relationship with the East Rand Board is corroborated by an employee of
another firm. According to the latter, the board favours the former by
processing its 99 year leasehold applications within 10 days, whereas,
if board officials dislike a particular company they can take anything
up to 24 months to register its applications (Interview 19). In contrast
to their relationships with the East Rand Development Board, several of
the top companies have experienced senior officialdom of the West Rand
Development Board as being particularly unhelpful. One firm steers clear
of the West Rand board "because they take too long" (Interview 13).
Others report that the board's director, John Knoetze, is intransigent
in the face of their appeals. Due to this problem these companies simply
sidestep the board and work with the local councils (Interviews 7 and 23).
On the Witwatersrand several of the "mayors" of these new institutions
have decidedly antagonistic attitudes towards the East and West Rand De-
velopment Boards (Interviews 3, 11, and 19). In respect of the housing
function the conflict appears to centre on the issue of acquisition and
control of land and housing stock. The boards want to maintain their hold
as custodians of the land, despite recent legislative changes (Interview
3). Furthermore, board bureaucrats are also said to be blocking the flow
of money going to the new local authorities in order to protect their own
jobs (Interview 17). One example of this is the attempt by the chief
director of one of the development boards to sell the board owned liquor
stores to private businesses, thereby depriving councils of a valuable
source of revenue. He announced this intention simultaneously with the
presentation of the black local authorities bill, leading to speculation
that he was attempting to further discredit the local councils (Interviews
3 and 19).
Perhaps the most insidious form of control which the boards exert is
through their officials who have been seconded to these councils. One
town council, for example, felt obliged to consult an independent lawyer
for advice on a land issue, rather than the lawyers employed by the de-
velopment board (Interview 3). These officials have also been accused
of using their power to prevent the employment of African personnel on
the councils. For example, on the East Rand there are 60 African gradu-
ates in public administration who are unemployed (Interview 19).
Some of the African "mayors" are, as a result of the above mentioned
incidents, predisposed to accepting "aid" from private businessmen. For
example, one businessman states that in 1983 he helped a township "mayor"
and his council to resist the West Rand Development Board. The latter
were apparently attempting to foist their redevelopment plans on to the
council, without consulting the latter. He acceded to a request by the
council to provide alternate plans. As a result the latter was able to
demand of the board that redevelopment take place according to its di-
rectives. He characterised his relationship with this particular local
authority as "you scratch my back and I'll scratch your back" (Interview
11
23). Similarly another company affiliated to UCASA in order to help the
councillors resist the development boards. A spokesperson for this com-
pany claims to spend much of his time explaining to the local councillors
their rights under the law (Interview 19).
Influential figures in central government, posts appear also to have
aided some companies in their attempts to limit the negative effects of
the development boards on their business activities. One director claims
to have had a sound working relationship with PG Koornhof, when the latter
was still minister of Co-operation and Development, to the extent of being
able to have a "purely instructional relationship with the East Rand De-
velopment Board" (Interview 23). These practices with central government
figures appear to be aimed at limiting the scope of the development boards
by enhancing the power and prestige of the local authorities. The pres-
tige of the local authorities took a small step forward during October
1984 with the recognition by the central government of UCASA - the result
of two years of lobbying by a private development company and the Urban
Foundation (Interview 23). The development boards also exercise consid-
erable power as the harbingers of certain information to the central au-
thorities . By presenting "counter information" to sympathisers on the
President's Council, another businessman hopes to nullify the efforts of
the boards (Interview 19).
Influence at central government level is not merely a way of sur-
mounting the obstacles posed by intransigent development board officials.
It also helps companies to surmount other bureaucratic obstacles to the
pursuit of their business interests. A sound relationship with the Sur-
veyor General's office, for example, can expedite the approval of layout
and general building plans (Williams, 1984). One firm claims that through
the 'good offices" of Koornhof and Morrisson (the former's deputy in the
department of Co-operation and Development), it was able to secure the
implementation of the 99 year leasehold system in Wattville, where it had
been allocated several sites for building (Interview 12). Initially there
had been opposition from the National Parry MPs for Benoni and Boksburg.
They had argued against the implementation of the leasehold provisions
in what was a white group area (Interview 4).
The construction and financing activities of private businesses -
shaped by government policies and practices - makes possible the provision
of residences in townships on the Witwatersrand. Several of these busi-
nesses develop political practices in order to maximise capital turnover
and profit. In combination with the policies and practices of the state,
these practices have an uneven effect on the delivery of residences in
the townships.
The Effect of Business Activities on the Delivery of Residential Buildings.
Progressively more residences are being delivered in the townships than
during the early seventies. In 1970 3703, in 1971 1089 and in 1972 only
954 houses were*built for Africans (SAIRR, 1976: 84). In contrast 2649
African residential buildings were built on the Witwatersrand during
1981, 2102 during 1982, 2881 during 1983 and 5919 during 1984. By the
end of 1985 it is expected that a further 6129 will have been added to
this stock of newly constructed structures (see Table 6).
These houses vary according to materials and to different standards.
The majority of the newly constructed units which have been delivered in
the last five years, and of those planned for 1985 and 1986, are built
according to conventional standards. It is estimated that by 1986 22 067
of these conventionally built houses and flat units will have been de-
livered in townships on the Witwatersrand - sixty per cent of them being
state provided (see Table 6). A relatively small number of units, in-
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corporating cheaper materials and less stringent standards of con-
struction, are being built according to the principle of self help.
New agents are entering the process whereby residential buildings,
stands and infrastructure are delivered. The role of bodies such as the
development boards, is being limited to the provision of hostels (for
section 10 1 (d) migrants), and the provision of some of the bulk and link
infrastructure. The black local authorities are becoming involved in the
direct delivery of unserviced stands. Major upgrading and
electrification is being organised and provided by private companies, on
contract to either local councils or development boards. Private devel-
opment companies are delivering residences directly to some residents and
indirectly to others - the latter being the case when these companies
build on contract for the local state apparatuses. As a result of the
sale of state owned housing stock, private landlords are emerging as
providers of some accommodation in the townships.
In line with the state's influx control policy, only African people
with permanent urban residential qualifications are eligible to own or
let houses. This is in line with what appears to be an important feature
of the overall thrust by those elements in the Botha administration who
are attempting to restructure the status quo in the townships: the im-
provement of the quality of life" for urban Africans.
Public statements to the contrary notwithstanding, construction and
development companies, and building societies, are unable to overcome the
massive African housing shortage. During 1983, one source estimated this
to be 160 000 units (SAIRR, 1984: 264-268), while another claimed that
on the Witwatersrand alone the building backlog stood at 220 000 units
(Interview 23) . During the last five years an average of only 5476 houses
have been built annually (Hendler, 1985). At this rate it would take 30
years to wipe out the existing backlog - and much longer if one took into
account increases due to population growth. Some development companies
active in the African townships admit that private capital alone can do
very little about the shortage of African houses. They argue that some
form of state intervention is required because most residents cannot af-
ford to own their own houses (Interview 17). The apparent inability to
satisfy the demand for houses through market mechanisms, reflects funda-
mental barriers to the accumulation of capital in the African residential
building industry. As one businessman observed
"there is not the slightest hope of us housing our population. The
gap will only widen. ... Government can't afford to build those
homes. Private enterprise can only cater for a very small per-
centage of the population. On the Reef there is an unsubsidised
bond situation. Private enterprise cannot help any family with an
income of less than Rl 500 per month. Five per cent of the popu-
lation can afford this" (Interview 7)
Economic Barriers to the Accumulation of Capital.
Capital accumulation in the residential building industry appears to be
limited by the inability of the majority of African workers to afford the
costs of even the cheapest of housing units. This is especially true of
conventionally delivered houses. The current cost of erecting the 51/9
and 51/6 "matchbox" structures (arguably the cheapest serviced unit) is
R18 500 - including R6000 per site for installing an infrastructurai ma-
trix of water pipes and sewerage disposal channels in the ground beneath
the built superstructures (Williams, 1984) and R12 500 for the super-
structure itself (Interview 23). At current rates of interest the monthly
instalments required to pay back an 80% bond (R14 700) over a period of
30 years would be R237 (Interview 21). In order to qualify for a loan a
potential homeowner would have to earn at least R948 per month because
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of building society reluctance to aid breadwinners when the instalments
exceed 25% of their monthly income. Most African breadwinners, given
their monthly salaries and subsistence costs, cannot be realistically
expected to save the R237 on a monthly basis, let alone find the R3 700
required as a deposit. During 1980 more than 67% of African breadwinners
were earning less than R189,35 (Population Census 02-80-03, 1980:
275-276), the calculated average household subsistence costs for an
African family of six in the major urban areas (SAIRR, 1980: 84). In 1982
more than half of residents in Soweto, arguably the wealthiest African
township in the country, earned less than R277, the calculated monthly
cost of living for a family of six Sowetans (Potgieter, 1982; Republic
of South Africa, 1982: p64; para 3.3).
The building society rule would have excluded 97% of the economically
active African population in South Africa during 1980 (Population Census,
01-80-03, 1980: 275-276) and 98% of Soweto residents in 1982 (Republic
of South Africa, 1982: p64; para 3.3). As any salary increases since 1980
are more likely than not to have been offset by inflation, it seems rea-
sonable to regard these figures as a fairly accurate description of the
current situation. The vast majority of those who purchase their homes
on the private market are able to do so because they are government em-
ployees who receive a 65% monthly subsidy, in addition to a 100% bond
(Interview 18).
The reasons for the relatively high prices of the housing units appear
to inhere in the particular capitalistic system of producing buildings.
In South Africa the production of buildings is disaggregated over a number
of industries. These are; building construction, building components,
building materials, sub-contracting (i.e. electrical, plumbing, painting
and decorating) and associated professions (i.e. theoretical and techni-
cal production by architects, draughtspeople, engineers, land surveyors
and quantity surveyors). The particular prices of the housing units are
produced through the different ways in which the following elements com-
bine in the production processes of the above mentioned industries: the
prices of the materials and fixed capital (c); the price of labour power
(v); and the profit (p).
The problem of affordability is not limited to conventionally built
and delivered houses. A recent report on housing (Human Awareness
Programme, 1984), using certain affordability criteria, observes that the
costs of participation in the unconventional, low cost self help schemes
exclude an average of 96% of the inhabitants living in in the prescribed
areas. In the case of homeland schemes the figure drops to 73,3%.
In spite of the large saving made on labour, the cost of self help
dwellings - as is the case with all buildings - is influenced profoundly
by the industrialised production of materials and components. In South
Africa the extent of this influence is revealed by the fact that in 1982
materials and components contributed 54% to overall value composition of
all buildings (BIFSA, 1983a: 52). The influence can also be seen in the
building form itself and in the labour processes and technology which
makes building what it is at present (Ive and McGhie, 1982: 3/16; McGhie,
1982: 3/22; Gravejat, 1982: 2/11).
The recently implemented, and relatively cheap, state homeownership
scheme is likewise foundering on the rocks of the affordability crisis.
Despite the euphoria which greeted the announcement of this scheme in mid
1983, available financial data suggests that a fairly large proportion
of Africans are unable to enter the ranks of homeowners (Mabin and
Parnell, 1983: 153). By the end of 1984 only 14 727 houses in this scheme
had been sold (Interview 20). The total number originally available was
approximately 350 000 (SAIRR, 1984: 270).
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The reason for the relatively high prices of these state owned houses
is the principle of financial self sufficiency which still governs the
allocation of resources to the African townships, despite a radical de-
terioration in their finances during the 1970s (Bekker and Humphries,
1985: 162-163).7 Revenue from this sale represents a surplus because state
loans for the construction of most of these houses have been redeemed
through the collection of house rentals over the last 25 years. As far
as the state is concerned this surplus is a contribution from the African
communities towards the provision of new houses, maintenance of existing
units, and provision and upgrading of infrastructure (DCD, 1983).
The effectiveness of the apartheid housing policy lies perhaps not only
in its ability to deny shelter. It also seems to conceal fundamental
economic barriers to the accumulation of capital in the residential
building industry. The academic and political literature reflects this
by concentrating exclusively on political limitations to the provision
of African houses. According to these perspectives it is the political
system of apartheid which lies at the root of the housing question. The
state is seen as being responsible for the inadequate provision of shelter
in South Africa, and it is the state which is called upon to supply
dwelling units.
Conclusion.
Recent analyses, due to a lack of empirical detail and a focus on housing
as a means of reproducing labour power, have led to several misconceptions
of the African hous ing s ituation. Foremost among these is the
characterisation of the state's housing policy as a mere ideological
smokescreen without any basis in reality (Labour Research Committee,
1983b: 9-12). State housing policy cannot, however, simply be reduced
to the status of myth. Recent changes in policy have led not only to
increased expenditure on the building of houses and the provision of
services and township infrastructure. By effecting new objective social
stratifications in the townships, they also dovetail with other aspects
of attempts to improve "the quality of life". One emerging stratum is
the small sector in the building construction and related industries.
Another is the fledgling real estate sector. Home owners and tenants form
other strata.
The dismissal of the state's attempt to devolve more administrative
power to the third tier of government (i.e. the local councils) (Bloch,
1982; Labour Research Committee, 1983b), is equally simplistic. On the
Witwatersrand at least, these bodies are agents for the delivery of res-
idential stands, a significant aspect of the delivery of residential
buildings. The final chapter on the black local authorities has not yet
been written, even though they have little popular support.
A third misconception is the view that housing policy is formed ex-
clusively through a conflict between the state, capital and workers over
the the level of consumption of the labour force (Mare, 1980a; Wilkinson,
1981b). The evidence suggests that firms involved in the building and
allocation of houses are also having some effect in the formation of state
housing policy - the accumulation of caCpital being their motive.
In fact, attempting to effect policy changes is one of a number of
business practices in the provision of residences in townships. These
practices are profoundly influenced by other social practices. The
plethora of laws, dating from the Verwoerdian era and before, and some
of the bureaucrats who administer them, are obstacles to the achievement
of business objectives. Business practices are also shaped by the housing
functions of the Black Local Authorities, with whom private business is
obliged to liase in order to secure land on which to build.
"fhe black local authorities, are involved in
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a direct political conflict with conservative bureaucrats for greater
autonomy. In a bid to avoid bureaucratic pitfalls several companies wield
political influence at both central and local government level. Violent
social struggles between local agents of government and
extra-parliamentary groups, in addition to the internecine conflicts be-
tween the development boards and the local councils, mean that development
companies are thrown willy nilly into a political maelstrom.
Business practices are not only effects of political struggles. They
also embody the social production of shelter. Furthermore, the contours
of these practices are drawn not only according to exigencies internal
to the construction process. As a particular area of accumulation, the
building and allocation of residential buildings is linked to other sec-
tors of the national economy. Accordingly, business practices are also
effects of the rhythms of accumulation in other sectors of industry. The
low African wages paid by most industries, and the relatively high cost
of producing shelter in the economy of present day South Africa, presents
a major barrier to the accumulation of capital. Therefore, the potential
for success is greatly enhanced by access to relatively large scale fi-
nancial resources.
Notwithstanding the achievements of some businesses in increasing
turnover, as well as in effecting policy changes, it appears that funda-
mental economic barriers to the accumulation of capital lie at the heart
of the African housing question. A fundamental reallocation of resources
might be a pre-requisite for a thoroughgoing solution to the immense
shortage of shelter. A consideration of the allocation of resources to
housing can hardly ignore an analysis of the efficacy of the capitalistic
nature of the construction and related industries. Indeed, whether a
reallocation of the necessary magnitude is possible within the confines




 Figures which have been compiled by the author suffer from certain
limitations. They cover neither all the African townships on the
Witwatersrand, nor all the companies involved. Therefore they are not
comprehensive. Certain sources did not indicate the costs of the dwelling
units. The author made calculated guesses about these costs. This
guesswork was informed by the following facts. Key personnel in this
sector of business activity generally accept that the average price of
houses referred to as "core", "shell" or "low cost" is RIO 000 per unit
(including the installation of infrastructure) (calculated by the author
from Aubert and Bristow, 1984, and Interview 23). When these were the
type of houses referred to, the author assumed the above-mentioned price.
In cases where no indication was given as to the type of house being
constructed, the author assumed this to be the basic four roomed 5116 or
51|9 house. At current prices these cost approximately R20 000 per unit
(including the installation of infrastructure). This is likely to be an
underestimate because the majority of companies do not provide housing
of such a low standard. Certain companies have indicated that they
specialise in building units in a particular price range. Schachat Homes
(Pty) Ltd, for example, tend to sell houses costing between R25 000 and
R40 000. Gough Cooper Homes (Pty) Ltd tend to produce units costing be-
tween R40 000 and R50 000. In the appropriate cases the author assumed
the median between these limits to be the unit cost of a batch of houses
for which no prices had been specified. This information does have some
value, despite these limitations. There is evidence of a certain degree
of accuracy. Several of the sources confirm each other. In no instance
does any one source contradict another. Furthermore, the trends revealed
in these figures confirm the perceptions of key personnel in this sector
of business activity. In the absence of statistically reliable studies
these figures are arguably useful indicators of certain trends.
2
 In January 1968 the department of Bantu Administration and Develop-
ment sent a directive to local authorities stating that Africans living
in the prescribed areas should no longer be allowed to build their own
homes on 30 year leasehold plots, or to purchase houses from the local
authorities - they would in future be entitled "only to rent houses (SAIRR,
1979: 167).
"Following the Viljoen Committee's recommendations on ways of
dealing with the housing shortage, the government in 1983 revised
its housing strategy. In future its own role would be limited to
providing infrastructure and services, but housing only for lower
income groups (those earning below R150 per month); Africans should
increasingly pay for the'provision of housing, using in particular
their "sweat equity'; and the private sector should play a more
important role in providing housing. In addition, to facilitate
an increase in housing construction, the government revised its
housing standards, accepting the principles of core and shell
housing and of site and service schemes" (SAIRR, 1984: 268).
* The Black Housing Board was established in terms of section 8 of the
Housing Act of 1957 as a separate structure for dealing with African
housing. The abolition of the board in 1979 was in line with a recom-
mendation in the Riekert commission that the subsidisation of lower income
African housing should be put on the same basis as that for other popu-
lation groups .
5
 Self help schemes are usually of three types. In the site and ser-
vice schemes some standard of service is supplied to the plots, and owners
are expected to construct their own dwellings. Services differ from area
to area, depending on the rules and regulations of locdl authorities -
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they may vary from a tap every 200 metres and a bucket latrine system for
every site, to a wet wall with a tap, waterborne sewerage and electricity.
Controlled self help schemes involve a greater degree of control over the
type of dwelling erected and the time period of construction, by the im-
plementing authority. Here the owners can either build the house them-
selves, be assisted by the controlling authority, family and friends, or
subcontract in varying degrees. A major portion of self help schemes in
the white urban areas comprises the third type of self help namely,
starter housing. This involves: either a unit core or basic shelter with
ablution facilities, which can be extended later; or a shell house which
is a fully habitable dwelling without finishes, fittings and some internal
walls, which are provided by the household as funds become available; or
a roof first system, which provides the roof and basic support only -
excluding even walls (Business and Marketing Intelligence, 1984:
123-125).
6
 It was obvious, from their inception, that the community councils
had failed as a means of stabilising the urban townships - the low per-
centage poll in Soweto (6%) and other major urban areas was evidence of
the massive rejection of the councils (Bekker and Humphries, 1985: 104).
Similarly the newly established black local authorities also lack any
meaningful electoral support.
"in the election of November-December 1983 the overall poll was
(compared with 30% in 1978). In Soweto it was 10,7% (against 5,9%)
in 1978" (SAIRR, 1984: 258; 259)
7
 Bekker and Humphries argue that at least three factors account for
increases in the expenditure on African townships - the effects of in-
flation on the cost of providing services, the commitment to improve fa-
cilities, particularly during the late 1970s after the 1976 unrest, and,
thirdly, the consequences of the ending of the direct and indirect
subsidisation of these townships by the white municipalities.
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Interview 1 - with an official of the East Rand Development Board seconded
to a town council, on 12th October 1984.
Interview 2 - with above mentioned, on 19th November 1984.
Interview 3 - with a town councillor, on 19th November 1984.
Interview 4 - with the chief executive officer of a village council, on
16th November 1984.
Interview 5 - with the director of a development company, on 21st November
1984.
Interview 6 - with an employee of a development company, on 12th November
1984.
Interview 7 - with an employee of a housing construction company, on 3rd
December 1984.
Interview 8 - with an official of the West Rand Development Board seconded
to a town council, on 4th December 1984.
Interview 9 - with an official of the East Rand Development Board seconded
to a town council, on 24th October 1984.
Interview 10 - with an official of the East Rand Development Board sec-
onded to a town council, on 16th November 1984.
Interview 11 - with a town councillor, on 4th December 1984.
Interview 12 - with an employee of a development company, on 24th October
1984.
Interview 13 - with an employee of a house building company, in December
1984.
Interview 14 - with an official of the East Rand Development Board sec-
onded to a town, on 11th October 1984.
Interview 15 - with the above mentioned, on 20th November 1984.
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Interview 17 - with an employee of a housing construction company, on 3rd
December 1984.
Interview 18 - with an employee of a development company, on 6th November
1984.
Interview 19 - with an employee of a development company on 21st November
1984.
Interview 20 - with a researcher in Johannesburg, in April 1985.
Interview 21 - with an employee of a building society, on 13th July 1985.
Interview 22 - with an official of the East Rand Development Board sec-
onded to the a town council, on 24th October 1984.















W Packham, an ex employee of Concor Homes
currently director of Siyasana.
A Rabie, an employee of Gough Cooper Homes.
C Sandhile, an employee of Econo Homes.
J Schindler, an employee of the SA Institute of Race Relations
Mr Slade, an employee of the United Building Society.
A Williams, a director of Schachat Homes.
K Dijkstra, director of Econo Homes.
Mr Dreyer, an employee of Concor Homes.
J Fair, an ex employee of George Wimpey
currently employed by Alfred McAlpine.
A Lebish, an employee of Schachat Homes.
Mr McDougall, an employee of George Wimpey.
23
Capital accumulation and the allocation of residential buildings 24
Table 1
Estimated development company investment in newly constructed African
















•Protected as at December 1984
Source: Compiled by the author from
interviews and other sources.
Table 2
Estimated state investment in residential accommodation (including





























































•Project as at December, 1984.
Source: Compiled by the author from
interviews and other sources.
Capital accumulation and the allocation of residential buildings 25
Table 3
Estimated state investment in general infrastructure (i.e. roads,
























•Projected as at December, 1984
Sources: Compiled by the author from
interviews and other sources.
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Table 4
Proportional share of private African residential market on the Wit-
watersrand by various development companies.
YEAR
1982
! GROSS 1982 1
1| 1984
1
i GROSS 1984 i
| 1985*
] GROSS 1985 r
| Average
I '82, '84, '85






















































•Projected as at December 1984.
The 1983 figures represent a discrepancy to the trend of the other
years. One reason for this is that R12 m {or 41,5% of gross annual
turnover) was attributed to unspecified companies.
Source: Compiled by author from interviews and other sources.
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Table 5
Annual increases in turnover of the top third of development companies
operating in the private African residential market on the Witwaters-
rand.
| VALUE OF TURNOVER IN R millions \% Incr. in value
DEVELOPMENT | j


























































































Source: Compiled by author from interviews and other sources.
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Table 6





































TOTALS 8,643 11,023 2,401 22,067
•Projected as at December 1984.
Source: Compiled by the author from in-
terviews and other sources.
